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The (dis)establishment of  
gender: Care and gender roles 
in the family as a constitutional 
matter
Ruth Rubio-Marín*
This article reasons that for women, as constitutional subjects, the emancipatory promise 
of  constitutionalism was—from its inception—fundamentally limited by the entrenchment 
of  the separate spheres tradition. Focusing on evolving constitutional jurisprudence in the 
US, Germany and Italy, the article describes a gradual and still imperfect process of  (dis)
establishment of  the originally enshrined gender order, as it has unfolded since the 1970s 
in US and European constitutionalism. It is argued that these processes have allowed the 
constitutional doctrine of  sex equality to challenge the most forthright expressions of  the 
separate spheres ideology, denying the possibility of  according men and women a different 
legal status of  rights and duties and keeping women away from the marketplace. In spite of  
this, to this day, the sex constitutional equality doctrine has been an inadequate tool to fully 
subvert the pre-established gender order in both its transatlantic iterations. In the US, we find 
assimilationist workerism with its anti-stereotyping conception of  gender equality, providing 
no support for working women, and in Europe accommodationist workerism, wherein special 
measures are fostered at the risk of  entrenching rather than subverting existing gender roles. 
The article then describes recent evolutions in constitutionalism pointing to a promising third 
way, with Nordic inspiration, which, challenging traditionally accepted notions of  family pri-
vacy and foregrounding fatherhood as opposed to just motherhood, would allow us to retain 
the central importance attached to care and reproduction, but at the same time assist in the 
process of  overcoming traditional gender assumptions and stereotypes built around them.
1. Introduction
Constitutionalism brought the promise of  a new basis of  legitimacy for the political 
order. Yet the understanding that there were two separate domains—the public, built 
around civil society, the market, and the state apparatus, as the domain in which 
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the modern promise of  egalitarianism was to deploy its effects, and the private, built 
around the marital family, where nature and biology were supposed to continue their 
own normative and ordering dictates—was simply accepted as part of  the material 
constitution, or superstructure, of  the societies of  the time. This understanding was 
central to the “constitutionalization” of  the two genders (embodied in the two sexes), 
and thus responsible for coining, in a more or less explicit manner, a gender specific 
conception of  citizenship marking the forms of  human flourishing, self-realization, 
and communal contribution expected from each of  the sexes, paradigmatically assign-
ing the role of  reproduction and care within the family to women.
The conquest of  men’s rights by women, such as the enfranchisement of  women, 
which only occurred after the turn of  the twentieth century, and, in many countries, 
not until after World War II, finally turned women into political citizens, but did not 
challenge the expectation of  women’s devotion to the family in any significant way. 
The gradual, though still imperfect, incorporation of  women in the male-dominated 
employment domain, an incorporation facilitated by increasingly powerful and often 
constitutionally embedded equality law, was also crucial in the expansion of  women’s 
citizenship, and has significantly challenged the often unstated assumption that wom-
en’s natural place and role in society was just to be mothers, to nurture and to care for 
others. Yet, despite these concrete advances, the emancipatory promise of  constitu-
tionalism has remained fundamentally limited by the constitutional entrenchment of  
the separate spheres tradition, around which the constitutional “state gender order” 
revolved since its inception, with expectations surrounding the division of  care labor 
in the family that continue to limit women’s incorporation to the public sphere playing 
a central role.
In the new millennium, we observe the proliferation of  constitutional struggles 
around the (dis)establishment of  this gender order. The explicit challenge to the nor-
mative legacy of  the separate spheres tradition—and the gendered understanding of  
both personhood and citizenship embedded in it—is finding jurisprudential and nor-
mative expression in recent constitutionalism. New approaches are proposed which 
focus not only on what constitutional sex equality provisions mean, allow for, or even 
demand, but also, crucially, on the domains in which they are to apply, pushing the 
boundaries of  what, to this day, have remained institutionally protected and deeply 
gendered spheres of  individual and collective autonomy and self-organization. To men-
tion perhaps the clearest example, lively constitutional debates and new parity fram-
ings have mushroomed around the world during the last two and a half  decades along 
with the adoption of  legislative gender parliamentary quotas as measures intended to 
“feminize” the public sphere, addressing the persistent political under representation 
of  women which the historical conquest of  women’s suffrage did not remedy.1
1 See Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Achievement of  Female Suffrage in Europe: On Women’s Citizenship, 12(1) Int’l 
J. Const. l. 4 (2014). On the constitutional struggles generated around the adoption of  gender quotas see 
Blanca Rodríguez-Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of  Representation: On Democracy, Equality and 
Parity, 6(2) Int’l J. Const. l. 287 (2008) and Ruth Rubio-Marín, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex 
Equality Model and Why it Won’t Fly in the United States, 60 Am. J. Comp. l. 99 (2012).
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Important as these struggles are, since the turn of  the century, we also find increas-
ing constitutional recognition for the fact that the dismantling of  the sexual contract 
must also penetrate family walls, and that the private realm and domestic life must 
be correspondingly “masculinized.” This recognition represents the acknowledg-
ment that gender roles and the valuation and distribution of  care responsibilities 
and work within the household are, to some extent at least, matters of  constitutional 
substance.2 This incipient but groundbreaking shift, potentially expanding the con-
tent and domain of  application of  constitutional sex equality doctrines, has largely 
escaped the analysis of  constitutional scholarship so far. Likewise, the elements in 
constitutional doctrine facilitating or instead rendering this shift unlikely under dif-
ferent constitutional traditions have been little explored.
This article, which contrasts European and US constitutionalism,3 primarily relying 
on German and Italian constitutional sources for the latter, describes the process of  
the constitutional embedding of  the gender order since the dawn of  constitutionalism 
(Section 2), and depicts what I claim were only modest disruptions to this order that 
came about with the sanctioning of  female suffrage and the prohibition of  sex dis-
crimination that characterized early post-World War II constitutionalism. Section 3 
describes an era of  constitutional market sex equality (between the 1970s and 1990s), 
which took place both in the US and Europe, as formal discriminations were abolished 
from the legal system and the incorporation of  women to the employment market 
came to be seen as the paradigmatic achievement of  emancipatory constitutional 
gender equality doctrines. I  argue that, in spite of  some important commonalities 
(especially in the affirmation of  an equal legal status for men and women as a mini-
mum constitutional threshold), this constitutionalism took slightly different shapes 
on each side of  the Atlantic. In the US, it took the form of  assimilationist workerism 
(with a gradual emphasis on strict gender neutrality and a central preoccupation with 
combatting all forms of  gender stereotypes, especially those keeping women at home). 
In Europe, an accommodationist workerism prevailed, helped by both the explicit and 
2 See Jennifer Nedelsky, The Gendered Division of  Household Labor: An Issue of  Constitutional Rights, in FemInIst 
ConstItutIonAlIsm: GlobAl perspeCtIves 15 (Beverley Baines, Daphne Brak-Erez, & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2012).
3 A note on methodology: because the focus of  this article is on constitutionalism, Europe and the US were 
chosen as the regional cradles of  constitutionalism. That said, talking about “European” constitutionalism 
(unless one refers specifically to the constitutionalism of  the European Union which is not my intent here) 
is always a gross oversimplification, given that different European countries each have their distinctive con-
stitutional traditions. In view of  this, the coining of  a model as a “European constitutional model,” for the 
purposes of  this article, means that the model, which is in contrast to a US model, is the most representative 
in Europe and/or that it is one around which there is an increasing convergence across Europe. As we shall 
see, this convergence has sometimes been facilitated by the supranational forces of  European law and poli-
cies. The interest in constitutional (as opposed to legal) gender models explains why I have chosen to focus 
on the US as well as on two European countries, Germany and Italy, in which constitutionalism (as opposed 
to just parliamentarism/law making) has been a central element in the consolidation of  their democracies. 
The fact that Germany and Italy are the oldest constitutional democracies established in post-World War II 
Europe, and that they incorporated a system of  judicial review of  legislation is precious when it comes to 
assessing what is specifically “constitutional” in substance and how changing sociological understandings 
of  gender relations since the 1950s—the historical moment of  cultural glorification of  the breadwinner 
family model—have been facilitated or not by constitutional structures pre-dating them, as well as for the 
identification of  judicially constructed doctrines which have facilitated their adaptation.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icon/article-abstract/13/4/787/2450825
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 08 June 2018
790 I•CON 13 (2015), 787–818
traditional centrality given to motherhood under European constitutionalism, and a 
substantive equality doctrine foregrounding the need to correct social inequalities.
 After describing the virtues and shortcomings of  both constitutional models, 
I point to signs in contemporary European constitutionalism signaling the potential 
of  a more promising third way: a constitutionalism which retains the central import-
ance traditionally attached to care and reproduction as matters of  individual and col-
lective responsibility, but at the same time assists in the process of  overcoming old 
gender assumptions and stereotypes. Section 4 traces the evolution of  European poli-
cies as well as jurisprudential and textual advances in constitutional law in Europe 
and beyond, signaling the shifts required for the successful challenge of  the bread-
winner family model, as the cornerstone of  the original gender order. These include: 
(i) the de-gendering of  care roles—something which in turn requires a new consti-
tutional understanding of  fatherhood; (ii) the overcoming of  the myth of  state neu-
trality regarding the internal organization of  the family—something which requires 
changes in our constitutionally protected notions of  privacy and formal equality in 
the family; and (iii) the need to constitutionally conceptualize care through the lens of  
citizenship by foregrounding not just rights, but also notions of  individual and collec-
tive responsibility. The article concludes (in Section 5) with a plea for humanity, and 
the possibility of  a gender constitutionalism allowing men and women to fully develop 
all their capabilities, taking this as the standard against which to measure the original 
promise of  equal citizenship that has animated constitutionalism since its inception.
2. The constitutional embedding of  a gender order 
and its modest disruption in early post-World War II 
constitutionalism (from the beginning through the 1960s)
Nineteenth-century, as well as early twentieth-century, constitutionalism was built on 
the assumption of  women’s relegation to, and subordination within, the private sphere. 
Marriage, as a contract, was key to understanding the inner contradictions of  this new 
order, i.e., modernity. It was the fiction of  marriage as a contract (as Carole Pateman 
brilliantly explained in The Sexual Contract)4 that allowed to simultaneously affirm and 
overcome women’s status order characteristic of  pre-modern times—a fiction rooted 
in women freely “contracting into” an institution that secured patriarchy and affirmed 
their obedience to men. With modernity then, women’s place in society and in the polity 
came to be centered around a separate-spheres tradition articulated along a double axis: 
the axis of  subordination, inherited from pre-modernity; and the axis of  separation or 
complementarity, more typically modern, which the marriage contract was supposed to 
legitimate, with the very consolidation of  family law as a separate legal discipline dur-
ing precisely this time reflecting the historical transformation of  the household into a 
nuclear family accompanying the move to modern industrialist social order.5
4 CArole pAtemAn, the sexuAl ContrACt (1988).
5 See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporaty 
Studies of  Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 Am. J. Comp. l. 756 (2010).
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Whether implicitly assumed or explicitly articulated, it was the understanding of  
the traditional family (supported by family and marital law) that primarily shaped 
women’s legal status and citizenship. Major family law reforms to ensure women’s 
civic equality (not in the market place or civil society, as civic equality was traditionally 
understood by and for men, but specifically within the family and marriage) became 
a reality starting only in the 1970s as a legacy of  second-wave feminism’s direct con-
frontation with the sexual contract and the traditional family.
As constructed primarily in the early years of  the Industrial Revolution and lasting until 
the mid-twentieth century, this “traditional” family was defined in express contrast with 
the world of  the marketplace, thus delimiting a second-order private sphere for women.6 
The marketplace, expected to be inhabited largely by men, was associated with money, 
choice, and negotiation through contract. Its counterpart was the home, associated with 
love and self-sacrifice, and identified with women and children. In this traditional home, 
the notions of  hierarchy and community prevailed over equality and individuality, and 
roles and status were determined through reference to age and gender.7 Increasingly, love 
was supposed to be the glue keeping it all together by ensuring the identity of  interests of  
the spouses. Even as the elements of  hierarchy came, in time, to be gradually toned down, 
equality between the spouses gradually becoming the aspired goal, the romanticized cul-
tural construct of  the differentiated gender roles proved most resilient.
Whether explicitly or implicitly sanctioned, this concept of  family was the corner-
stone of  the gender order from the dawn of  constitutionalism in both Europe and the US. 
Dating back to 1787, the US Constitution remains one of  the few major written consti-
tutions, which, to this date, and after long and failed attempt of  incorporation through 
an Equal Rights Amendment, still lacks a provision declaring the equality of  the sexes. 
Moreover, expressive of  the revolutionary period’s emphasis on foregrounding the indi-
vidual (and breaking away from the ancien regime’s privileging of  intermediate bodies 
and status), the US Constitution, not unlike other revolutionary texts, is for the most part 
silent on the family. This silence reflects not the denial of  the family’s central importance 
as a structuring cell in society, but rather the “normalization” or “de-politicization” of  
the marital family-based political order.8 Moreover, in spite of  this constitutional silence, 
the direct link between the construction of  the family organization and marriage, on the 
one hand, and the exclusion of  women from the public sphere—interpreted as including 
both the marketplace and politics—on the other hand, can easily be confirmed through 
the gendered subtexts present in many of  the Supreme Court’s early decisions. Consider, 
for instance, Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in Bradwell v. State, denying women the 
right to practice law, focusing on the petitioner’s status as a married woman:
6 See stephAnIe Coontz, mArrIAGe, A hIstory: how love Conquered mArrIAGe (2005).
7 Id.
8 It is also telling that the Amendments to the US Constitution did not include an explicit reference to the 
institution of  family or marriage other than for the purpose of  federalism. In spite of  the US constitutional 
silence on marriage and the family, in the 1920s, on the basis of  the Lochner era’s contractual and eco-
nomic liberty, the Supreme Court for the first time recognized some protection for parental prerogatives 
in the education and raising of  children, grounding it on Sixteenth Amendment substantive due process 
guarantees: see Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of  Sisters, 628 U.S. 510 (1925). The family, consti-
tutionally speaking, thus came to be primarily conceived as a sphere of  privacy or non-state intervention.
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The constitution of  the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well 
as in the nature of  things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the 
domain and functions of  womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of  interests and views 
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of  a woman 
adopting distinct and independent career from that of  her husband. . . . It is true that many 
women are unmarried and not affected by any of  the duties, complications, and incapacities 
arising out of  the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount 
destiny and mission of  woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of  wife and mother. 
This is the law of  the Creator. And the rules of  civil society must be adapted to the general con-
stitution of  things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.9
In Europe, early post-revolutionary, nineteenth-century constitutions had 
remained for the most part silent on the family in a similar attempt to foreground the 
individual.10 We must turn to the short-lived constitutional experiences of  the inter-
war period to find a much more explicit recognition of  the central political impor-
tance attributed to the marital family as a foundational cell in society. These inter-war 
family traces signal the growing preoccupation of  the welfare state model in Europe, 
with the protection of  the institution of  the family as the institution to which the 
social function of  care was assigned, and motherhood as a supposedly vulnerable 
condition in need of  protection.11 Democratic constitutionalism, however, failed to 
establish itself  solidly until the second half  of  the twentieth century—first hindered 
by monarchical reactionary forces and thereafter by fascist and totalitarian regimes.
Due to the significant overlap in time between the heyday of  the breadwinner-family 
model—in the 1950s and early 1960s, coinciding with a strong post-war pronatalist 
movement—and the early post-World War II wave of  European constitutionalism, the 
features of  the “traditional” family remained entrenched in this new constitutional-
ism, even though it also picked up and furthered the interwar constitutionalism seeds 
of  expression of  sex equality which had mostly served to challenge women’s political 
disenfranchisement. From the perspective of  the gender order, the post-World War 
9 See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141–142 (1873) (Bradley concurring).
10 See Pierre Murat, La Constitution et le mariage: regard d’un privatiste, 39(2) les nouveAux CAhIers du ConseIl 
ConstItutIonnel 19, 20–21 (2013) (arguing that it is not until the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution that 
the institution of  the family gains meaningful constitutional recognition in France—and this mostly as a 
reflection of  an increasing concern of  the welfare state with social matters reinforced by post-World War 
I natalism—and that this is in conformity with the effort of  classic constitutionalism to break away from 
the projection of  family structures into the political universe.)
11 The 1919 Weimar Constitution, for instance, recognized the social centrality and political relevance of  
the family structure. Article 119 (under a chapter devoted to “Life within Community”) provides:
Marriage, as the foundation of  the family and the preservation and expansion of  the nation, 
enjoys the special protection of  the constitution. It is based on the equality of  both genders. It 
is the task of  both the state and the communities to strengthen and socially promote the family. 
Large families may claim social welfare. Motherhood is placed under state protection and welfare.
  In Europe, then, the constitutional idea of  the family emerges not only as a sphere of  private autonomy, 
but of  active state concern at the formative period of  the welfare state, a welfare state designed to reflect 
the breadwinner and the family wage system, having women as primary caretakers, domestic workers, 
and, at best, secondary wage earners. See Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of  Citizenship: The 
Comparative Analysis of  Gender Relations and Welfare States, 58 Am. soC. rev. 303, 328 (1993).
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II European constitutional movements are thus better interpreted as a mix between 
continuity and progressive change, rather than as a full rupture with the underlying 
social, political, and economic order established since modernity. In short, in spite of  
the ever growing consensus on the need to explicitly articulate the equality between 
the sexes and/or a prohibition of  discrimination on the grounds of  sex, the active dis-
establishment of  the separate spheres traditions dictating men’s and women’s distinc-
tive roles in society was not a core element of  the early agenda of  post-World War II 
constitutionalism, and, to the extent it was an element at all, it was the subordination 
rather than the romanticized differentiation axis that was tackled.
If  we look at the political domain, it is no doubt important that, after World 
War II, all those European countries that came to solidly embrace democratic 
constitutionalism, but had not yet enfranchised women, including France, or 
had done so only for a few years during the interwar period before the irrup-
tion of  dictatorships, such as Spain, now felt the urge to do so, as the struggles 
long fought for by first-wave feminists were finally ready to be harvested. Yet, 
then again, in spite of  women’s political emancipation through enfranchisement, 
some explicit gender-based distinctions in the political-civic domain remained 
in the constitutions (and remain still today!), perpetuating women’s exclusion 
from equality in citizenship functions and duties. This includes, paradigmatically, 
women’s differential treatment regarding military duties,12 but also, for instance, 
gender-discriminatory rules on the succession of  the Crown in some parliamen-
tary monarchies.13
More importantly, if  we turn our eyes to the family domain, we realize that the early 
post-World War II constitutions kept recognizing the institution of  the (often explicitly 
heterosexual and/or marital) family as the foundational cell of  society, a repository of  
care and dependence, deserving state recognition and protection. Within this family 
domain, the specific centrality of  motherhood, and not just parenting, was then often 
expressly acknowledged,14 some of  the new constitutions being in fact most explicit 
12 Thus, in 1956, when Germany finally came to have an army, the Constitution was amended. Article 
12(4), however, exempted women from being required to render service in any unit of  the armed forces by 
law, and prohibited women from being employed in any service involving the use of  arms. Subsequently, 
in the 1968 amendment, art. 12(4) was deleted, and art. 12a (4) inserted, providing that women could 
be obliged to serve in the armed forces, especially in medical care units, but were not allowed to serve in 
any units involving the use of  arms. On Dec. 23, 2000, this sentence was changed, and now the text only 
makes reference to the impossibility of  forcing women to serve in the armed units of  the military, some-
thing they were allowed to do from Jan. 1, 2001. Notice that also art. 13 of  the Swedish Constitution’s 
equality clause provides that “no act of  law or other provision may imply the unfavorable treatment of  
anyone on grounds of  gender, unless the provision forms part of  efforts to promote equality between men 
and women or relates to compulsory military service or other equivalent official duties.”
13 See ConstItuCIón espAñolA (C.E.), B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 57.1 (Spain).
14 GrundGesetz Für dIe bundesrepublIk deutsChlAnd [GrundGesetz] [GG] [bAsIC lAw], May 23, 1949, BGBl I, art. 
6.1, devoted to the family, provides that “[m]arriage and family enjoy the special protection of  the State”, 
whereas art. 6.2 acknowledges that “care and upbringing of  children are the natural right of  the par-
ents and a duty primarily incumbent on them, a duty over which the State is to watch.” Telling, for our 
purpose, is the fact that, according to art. 6.4, “every mother is entitled to the protection and care of  the 
community” (my emphasis).
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about women’s expected roles within the breadwinner-family model.15 In other words, 
whatever the meaning initially attached to constitutional gender equality provisions, 
they were seen as compatible with (rather than a challenge to) the existence of  a 
social order structured around marital families within which men and women were 
expected to perform different (and sometimes subordinate) roles. This was then ren-
dered explicit by the first decisions of  courts in charge of  interpreting the constitu-
tional provisions. Let us take a look at some telling examples.
In Italy, for instance, although article 3 of  the 1947 Italian Constitution refers to 
“all citizens having equal social dignity and being equal before the law, without dis-
tinction of  sex,” major gender-egalitarian reforms were not passed until the 1970s, 
including the first major family code reform which was approved in 1975. As a result, 
the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) was confronted with explicitly discriminatory 
provisions several times during the 1960s. Its case law, as shown in the two examples 
discussed below, reflects a patriarchal and hierarchical understanding of  the family 
and the implicit breadwinner model. In 1961, the court upheld a criminal code provi-
sion making the wife’s adultery a criminal offence, yet qualifying the husband’s as 
such only when it was performed within the household or “notoriously” elsewhere, 
considering the distinction justified on the basis of  the social consensus around the 
different meanings of  men’s and women’s adultery, as well as by the fact, taken as self-
evident, that the wife’s adultery constituted a more serious attack on family unity.16 
Similarly, in 1967, the court validated a norm of  the civil code wherein, in case of  
consensual separation, a husband had to provide for all of  his wife’s needs regard-
less of  the latter’s financial situation (the wife being only obliged to do so in case of  
the husband’s having insufficient means of  subsistence). The differential treatment 
was justified this time by the allegedly superior status within the family granted to the 
15 This is, for instance, the case in Italy’s 1947 Constitution. Indeed, under Costituzione [Cost.] 1947, Pt 
II, Title II, devoted to “Ethical and Social Relations,” the Italian Constitution includes a series of  provi-
sions which leave little doubt as to the expected social function of  the marital family, and of  women’s 
role within it. Article 29.1 recognizes the family as a “natural association founded on marriage,” and 
although art. 29.2 provides that marriage entails “the moral and legal equality of  the spouses,” it also 
foresees that such equality is to take place “within legally defined limits to protect the unity of  the fam-
ily.” Also, although Art. 30 (on parental duties and rights) refers indistinctively to the duty and right to 
support, instruct, and educate the children, including those born out of  wedlock, art. 31.1 makes it the 
state’s duty to further family formation and the fulfillment of  related tasks by means of  economic and 
other provisions, with special regard to large families, and 31.2 adds that the Republic protects maternity, 
infancy and youth, supporting and encouraging institutions needed for this purpose. Even more telling 
are the provisions on labor, wages, and equality of  women at work, included under Title III on “Economic 
Relations.” Article 36.1 explicitly refers to the family wage concept (literally, “workers are entitled to 
remuneration commensurate with the quantity and quality of  their work, and in any case sufficient to 
ensure to them and their families a free and honorable existence”); and art. 37, after recognizing in para-
graph 1 that “working women are entitled to equal rights and, for comparable jobs, equal pay as men”, 
recognizes in paragraph 2 that “working conditions have to be such as to allow women to fulfill their 
essential family duties and ensure an adequate protection of  mothers and children” (emphasis added).
16 See Corte Cost., 28 novembre 1961, n. 64 (It.). Only a few years later, the court would depart from this 
doctrine. See Corte Cost., 16 dicembre 1968, n. 126 (It.); Corte Cost., 16 dicembre 1968, n. 127 (It.); 
Corte Cost., 27 novembre 1969, n. 147 (It.).
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husband by law, which in turn was said to imply the husband’s “marital authority” as 
well as his obligation to provide for his wife.17
The German starting point was slightly different. The German Basic Law of  1949 
also contained a reference (art. 3.2) to men and women having equal rights, as well 
as a prohibition (art. 3.3) of  discrimination on the grounds of  gender. And there too 
the first major sex egalitarian reforms of  family law were not passed until 1977.18 
The main difference between Germany and Italy was that, already from the start, the 
German court understood the subordination element of  the traditional family to be 
incompatible with the new constitutional gender order. Yet, the same could not be 
said about the separation/differentiation axis. Thus, in interpreting the gender equal-
ity and the sex antidiscrimination clauses in the Constitution, the early jurisprudence 
of  the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) held that different treatment on account of  
gender was constitutionally forbidden, except when it could be grounded in “objective 
biological or functional” sexual differences and be to the advantage of  women,19 a 
rhetoric which not surprisingly had its peak during the 1950s and 1960s.20 “Separate 
but equal” treatment, so to speak, was constitutionally acceptable as long as equal 
worth was attached to men and women’s roles within the family (i.e., the breadwin-
ner and the housewife).21 This doctrine allowed the court, for instance, to uphold 
a rule granting widowers a pension only if  the deceased wives had been the main 
breadwinners, whereas a widow’s pension was granted regardless of  similar consid-
erations.22 Essential to the support of  breadwinner-family model was also the narra-
tive of  state neutrality and marital privacy, which the court based on article 6.1 GG, 
as encompassing the autonomy of  the couple to decide about the internal structure 
of  the family, including whether one or both spouses would be income earners.23 As 
we shall see (in Section 4), it is the interpretation of  this doctrine that has come to be 
challenged in recent years, and it is this challenge that is facilitating the first signs 
17 See Corte Cost., 12 dicembre 1967, n. 144, overturned by Corte Cost., 24 giugno 1970, n. 133 (It.). For 
a critical analysis of  this case law and the way the concept of  family unity was initially used by the Court 
to entrench gender stereotypes based on a patriarchal family model, see Barbara Pezzini, La Struttura di 
Genere della Famiglia nella Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, in Come Il Genere CostruIsCe Il dIrItto e Il dIrItto 
CostruIsCe Il Genere 23 (Barbara Pezzini ed., 2012).
18 Until Mar. 31, 1953, it was foreseen that laws contrary to gender equality clause of  art 3(2) GG would 
remain in force. The deadline lapsed without any major reforms. The Gesetz über dIe GleIChbereChtIGunG 
von mAnn und FrAu AuF dem GebIet des bürGerlIChen reChts (GleIChbereChtIGunGsGesetz—GleIChberG) [First 
Equal Treatment Act], June 18, 1957, BGBl. I S. 609, which entered into force July 1, 1958, covered civil 
aspects of  marriage and family. Certain patriarchal features of  the civil code were “overlooked” in this 
reform, and this led to several constitutional challenges. The first act comprehensively reforming mar-
riage and family law (erstes Gesetz zur reForm des ehe- und FAmIlIenreChts (1.EheRG), June 14, 1976, BGBl. 
I S. 1421) entered into force only on July 1, 1977. See Barbelies Wiegemann, Der Hürdenlauf  der Frauen 
im Rechtseit 1900, in FrAuen und reCht reAder 28 (Swantje Stephan ed., 2003).
19 See bundesverFAssunGsGerICht [bverFGe] [FederAl ConstItutIonAl Court] 3, 225, Dec. 18, 1953 (Ger.).
20 See Blanca Rodríguez Ruiz & Ute Sacksofsky, Gender in the German Constitution, in the Gender oF 
ConstItutIonAl JurIsprudenCe 149, 152 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marín eds., 2005).
21 See id., at 152.
22 See bverFGe 17, 1, July 24, 1963 (Ger.).
23 See, for all, bverFGe 6, 55, at 58, Jan. 17, 1957 (Ger.) and bverFGe 9, 237, at 22, Apr. 14, 1959 (Ger.).
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of  a more complete subversion of  the gender order entrenched in the constitutional 
project since its inception.
3. The era of  market equality: the potential and limitations 
of  assimilationist and accommodationist sex equality (the 
1970s–1990s)
In terms of  gender order disestablishment, the first breakthrough moment came in 
the 1970s, and was directly related to the second-wave feminism’s challenge to wom-
en’s relegation to the private sphere. It was then that the courts started to read out of  
their constitutions the need to overcome women’s distinct marital status and expand 
women’s role beyond the family, increasingly focusing on ensuring women’s market 
equality. Yet, constitutionally speaking, this was articulated in two different ways on 
each side of  the Atlantic. Let us see.
3.1. The United States: the boundaries of  assimilationist workerism
In the United States it was women’s rights’ advocates who, starting in the 1970s, per-
suaded the Supreme Court to read the guarantees of  gender equality into the Equal 
Protection Clause.24 Frontiero v.  Richardson,25 decided in 1973, was the first case in 
which the court articulated the now orthodox view that laws based on gender ste-
reotypes are unconstitutional. The case was brought by a wage-earning wife holding 
the unstereotypical position of  lieutenant in the US Air Force, who sought benefits 
including housing and medical insurance for her husband, and gave the court the 
occasion to recognize the fundamental role that marriage law had played in keeping 
women subordinate to men.26 In just a few years after being adopted, the doctrine 
started deploying its effects, turning anti-gender-stereotyping into the essence of  the 
anti-sex discrimination principle and serving both men and women alike.
Interestingly, Justice Bader Ginsburg, at the time head of  the American Civil 
Liberties Union and a leading force in the decade-long campaign to consolidate the 
constitutional doctrine fighting gender inequality in the form of  sex stereotypes, drew 
some of  her inspiration from Europe. In particular, Ginsburg was inspired by her stud-
ies of  Swedish law and by Sweden’s approach to women’s rights, seeking not only the 
opening of  the public sphere to women, but also, since the early 1960s, the open-
ing of  the home to men.27 In the US, this doctrine found synergies with anti-racism 
24 The first case was Reed v. Reed, holding it irrational, and thus unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause, for the state of  Idaho to prefer “males to females” as estate administrators when the degree of  
relationship to the decedent was otherwise equal. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971).
25 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
26 Literally, “throughout much of  the 19th century the position of  women in our society was, in many respects, 
comparable to that of  blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, 
serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal 
capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of  their own children” (id. at 685).
27 See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 n.y. l. rev. 
83, 98–99 (2010).
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theories which became the focus of  attention of  social scientists already in the 1940s 
and 1950s.28 The anti-gender stereotyping constitutional doctrine had an impact on 
family law in the 1970s, when the entrenched explicit sex-based distinctions were 
overcome, including those that also imposed limiting gender stereotypes on men. In 
1975, for instance, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Supreme Court held that denying 
survivor’s benefits to a widower would have discriminated both against his deceased 
wife as wage earner, and against him as the surviving caregiver to their child.29 Most 
tellingly, that same year, in Stanton v. Stanton, the Supreme Court struck down differ-
ential ages of  majority for boys and girls for the purposes of  determining a divorced 
father’s support obligations towards children.30
From then on, whatever the statistical evidence would say about the enduring 
“functional” differences between the sexes (including, most tellingly, whether women 
in fact continued to bear most of  the childrearing and care responsibilities), any law 
that generalized on the basis of  such evidence, would be interpreted as “normaliz-
ing,” sanctioning, or entrenching different gender roles, and hence as discrimina-
tory. Thus, rather than reflecting and accommodating actual functional differences 
between the sexes, norms were supposed to ignore them as a way of  freeing the indi-
vidual from the expectations that might be imposed on them. Even in the paradig-
matic domain of  male citizenship—the military—generalizations about talents and 
capacities based on gender gradually ceased to be acceptable.31 Functional differ-
ences could not be accommodated, in contrast to so-called “real differences,” typic-
ally grounded in a very narrow interpretation of  biological distinctions.32 And even 
the latter faced growing challenge as the cultural construction of  biological features 
was increasingly acknowledged.
Moreover, as a matter of  constitutional doctrine, intent has been required to prove 
sex discrimination, also limiting the scope and the kinds of  norms and treatment 
that could be constitutionally challenged, leaving out of  purview those legal norms 
that, coined in gender neutral terms, arguably still reflect the breadwinner-family 
model, having a disparate impact on women’s enjoyment of  a full set of  rights. Also, 
although the Supreme Court, at least in its early jurisprudence, did not rule out that 
a differential treatment could be established as some form of  compensation for past 
28 Id., at 105–107.
29 See Weinberger v.  Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), holding unconstitutional the provision granting 
social security survivor’s benefits only to mothers and not to fathers.
30 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975). See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278–280 (1979), 
stating that husbands had to be eligible for alimony equally with wives, and declaring the state’s purpose 
of  reinforcing a model of  “allocation of  family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent 
role . . . no longer valid to justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of  gender.”
31 See United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996), striking down a scheme placing female would-be 
cadets in a separate, but decidedly unequal, girls’ school lacking Victoria Military Institute’s funding and 
prestige. In the decision, the Supreme Court once again underscored the fact that gender stereotypes are 
the antithesis of  gender equality.
32 For instance, the statutory rape protecting underage girls but not boys was held to reflect merely a natu-
ral asymmetry: the heavy burdens of  possible pregnancy would deter girls from underage sex, but boys 
needed the added disincentive of  criminal law: see Michael M. v. Super. [Ct. of  Sonoma County], 450 U.S. 
464, 473 (1981).
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discrimination,33 its general evolution towards an anti-classification and a symmetri-
cal approach to the Equal Protection Clause translated in the application of  a height-
ened (concretely, an intermediate) standard of  review to be applied to all forms of  
gender-based distinctions, among other things, to screen out apparent “preferences” 
that are in reality “confining,” “protectionist,” or “paternalistic” (sometimes described 
as affirmative action for “ladies” as opposed to “women”).
 Together, the stringent limitations to the forms of  constitutionally valid protec-
tions under the anti-stereotyping interpretation of  the gender equality doctrine, as 
well as broader understandings about the limited role of  the state in correcting social 
inequalities, as part of  the country’s overall liberal political economy, has affected the 
possibility of  protecting pregnancy and motherhood. These protections, according to 
Ginsburg, who was well familiarized with their generalized existence in Europe, raised 
a troubling concern. In her own words, “patriarchal rules long sequestered women at 
home. . . . It is not always easy to separate rules that genuinely assist mothers and their 
children by facilitating a woman’s pursuit of  both paid world and parenting, from laws 
that operate to confine women to their traditional subordinate status.”34 As a result, in 
the US, specific protections for motherhood have always been minimal, and have had a 
legislative, rather than constitutional, basis, especially after 1974, when the Supreme 
Court rejected the claim that pregnancy-based discrimination amounted to sex dis-
crimination.35 Protections have been constructed in a gender-neutral way, mostly pro-
ceeding by way of  assimilating pregnancy and motherhood into any other sickness 
or family care related employment leaves.36 Thus, although the goal of  the drafters of  
33 Thus, applying an intermediate scrutiny test, see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 313 (1975), upholding 
preference in allowing women more years to prove their worth in an up-or-out naval officer promotion 
scheme, and literally stating that “the different treatment of  men and women under [the challenged 
provisions] does not reflect archaic and overbroad generalization, but instead, the demonstrable fact that 
male and female line officers in the navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for profes-
sional service”; or Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 498 (1977), upholding preference of  counting fewer of  
women’s low-wage years in calculating social security retirement payouts to compensate for presumed 
wage discrimination.
34 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 
21 CArdozo l. rev. 253 (1999)
35 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where the Supreme Court argued that, although only women 
could become pregnant, not all women became pregnant. The case was brought by pregnant employ-
ees, alleging that California’s disability insurance system violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities, an exclusion which was not seen as gender discrimination.
36 Title VII’s prohibition of  discrimination on the basis of  sex was amended for that purpose in 1978: see 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of  1978, Pub. L. Nos. 95–555, 92 Sat. 2076 (1978), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
The Act came to play a central role in enabling women to obtain paid maternity leave, because it increas-
ingly forced wage replacement during maternity leave to be included in an employer’s temporary dis-
ability insurance plan. To this day, Title VII continues to serve as the main recourse that feminists and 
advocates for work–life balance turn to in their attempts to achieve legal protection for pregnant women 
and employees with family responsibilities, but the fight is always fought in gender-neutral terms: the 
worker without family obligations being the standard against which the individual is measured. On the 
dysfunctional protection of  pregnancy and motherhood needs through medical leaves, see Julie Suk, Are 
Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 Col. 
l. rev. 1, 16 (2010).
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the anti-stereotyping theory of  sex equality, including Ginsburg herself, was not the 
denial of  the central value of  human reproduction and care, but rather the challenge 
to gender roles and expectations around them, equality in terms of  sameness of  treat-
ment, or, in other words, assimilationist equality taking men as the point of  reference, 
and hence, assimilationist workerism, became the trend, especially since the flourish-
ing of  the New Right conservative agenda in the 1980s.
 This trend was consolidated and constitutionally affirmed with the passing of  the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993. With the explicit goal of  promoting 
equal employment opportunity for women and for men,37 and recognizing that “the 
primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and [that] such 
responsibility affects the working lives of  women more than it affects the working 
lives of  men,”38 the FMLA entitled covered employees to twelve weeks of  unpaid leave 
annually to care for a newborn baby or a newly adopted child, a sick family mem-
ber, or their own serious health condition.39 In its 2003 decision, Nevada Department 
of  Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court upheld the FMLA as a valid exercise 
of  Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment § 5 power to enforce the Equal Protection 
Clause,40 relying heavily on the fact that the leave guaranteed by the Act was gender 
neutral, thus cementing the notion that equal protection principles require strict gen-
der neutrality in any form of  action intended to protect parenting.41
It has been argued that the prevalence of  this assimilationist workerism has forced 
late feminists to focus on non-family circumstances, and that, in this context, the 
agenda of  “family values” has been for the most part unnecessarily handed over to 
the cultural right.42 Legal feminists embracing gender neutrality as an ideal in the 
family domain, some critical voices have claimed, have not duly recognized how this 
goal may not only be elusive, but in the end also risk marginalizing parenting and 
reproduction.43 This is particularly the case whenever, in spite of  its neutral framing, 
the legal system still rests on the assumption of  the family as the natural repository of  
“inevitable dependency.” This construction might have allowed dependency to be allo-
cated away from the state to the private grouping, and, in doing so, facilitated the con-
tinuation of  gendered-role divisions that are largely embraced by society.44 In other 
words, it seems that the US’s constitutional anti-stereotyping gender equality doctrine 
has not accommodated, for well-founded fear of  entrenching, the underlying social 
reality of  a gendered division of  roles and spheres, yet without having done enough 
37 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2006).
38 Id. § 2601(a)(5).
39 Id. 2612(a)(1).
40 Nevada Department of  Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
41 See Reva Siegel, You’ve come a Long Way, Baby: Rehquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in 
Hibbs, 58 stAn. l. rev. 1871, 1884 (2006). In a later case, the Supreme Court declared that the FMLA’s 
medical leave based on the “self-care,” as opposed to the family care, provision exceeded Congress’s § 5 
power so that the provisions were to be understood as binding only on private employers: see Coleman 
v. Court of  Appeals of  Maryland, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
42 mArthA A.  FInemAn, the neutered mother, the sexuAl FAmIly And other twentIeth Century trAGedIes 88 
(1995).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 161–162.
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to subvert it. In so doing, it might have contributed to rendering the social value of  
human reproduction invisible. Arguably, this evolution has also been facilitated by a 
constitutional doctrine of  family privacy strictly anchoring care and reproduction in 
the domain of  privacy, impenetrable to gender equality considerations.45
3.2. Europe: the boundaries of  accommodationist workerism
The European account reveals a different landscape resulting, broadly speaking, in 
a constitutional gender discrimination doctrine that does not “privatize” and silence 
pregnancy and motherhood, but rather seeks the adoption of  measures to facilitate 
the combination of  paid employment and unpaid care labor, but mostly for women, 
thereby accommodating and entrenching, rather than ignoring or subverting, wom-
en’s unique role in reproduction and family sustenance as well as generalized gender 
stereotypes surrounding it. Constitutionally speaking, we find a moment of  conver-
gence in the US and Europe around the 1970s, when formal equality between the 
sexes in every domain, including the family and the marketplace, is simultaneously 
affirmed, fuelled by the expansion of  market forces as well as the challenge to women’s 
confinement to the home and family domains, often reflected in openly discriminatory 
legal norms, by second wave feminism.
In Italy, for instance, already in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Italian 
Constitutional Court explicitly abandoned its precedent justifying women’s subordi-
nate position in the family.46 Soon thereafter, most of  the remaining explicit sex-based 
differentiations came to be seen as contrary to the principle of  equality, and legal 
reforms followed suit to remove them from the legal order. The main reform, in this 
sense, was that of  family law tackling several articles in the 1942 Civil Code in 1975. 
Similarly, in Germany, in the 1970s, formal equality was first strongly affirmed in the 
family domain, as defining the relationship between husband and wife.47 With the first 
45 The right to family life—family understood as autonomy and privacy, not as an institution deserving the 
active protection of  the state—was only affirmed for the first time in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (which was concerned with marital privacy regarding the use of  contraceptives). It has since 
expanded to cover a whole set of  family-related autonomy rights (sometimes recognized as pertaining 
to the individual, and sometimes to the marital unit, but always framed as negative or non-interference 
rights), including the right to marry, procreate, terminate pregnancy, cohabitate with extended family, 
raise children, and engage in sexual intimacy. Again, the family was simply assumed as the underlying 
cell in the social structure in the US. This can also be supported by the fact that, in Griswold, when the 
court first affirmed the notion of  marital privacy, it referred to a zone of  privacy derived from several con-
stitutional amendments; in fact, marital privacy was treated as (an implicit) “right older than the Bill of  
rights,” thus hinting at both its foundational and presumably natural character. See David D. Meyer, The 
Paradox of  Family Privacy, 53 vAnd. l. rev. 527 (2000).
46 See Corte Cost., 16 dicembre 1968, n. 126 (It.), departing from its precedent (Corte Cost., 28 novembre 
1961, n. 64 (It.)) regarding women’s differential treatment with respect to adultery. See also Corte Cost., 
24 giugno 1970, n. 133, overturning Corte Cost., 12 dicembre 1967, n. 144 (It.), and declaring contem-
porary conception of  spousal relationships to no longer be based on the superior status of  the husband.
47 For instance, the Federal Constitutional Court recognized that in a marriage between a German and a 
foreigner, it was discriminatory to grant the children German citizenship only if  the father was German: 
see bverFGe 37, 217, Mar. 21, 1974. The court also struck down the Civil Code’s provisions requiring all 
family members to take the husband’s family name, and wives, wanting to keep their birth name, to add 
it to their husband’s: see bverFGe 48, 327, May 31, 1978 (Ger.).
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legal reform of  marriage and family law of  1976, traditional family roles, whereby the 
husband was responsible for the income and the wife had to take care of  the house-
hold (the so-called Hausfrauenehe), were abolished in the German Civil Code (BGB).48 
Jurisprudentially, this reform was manifested in the fact that challenging or claiming 
differentiated or undifferentiated treatment on the basis of  the assumption of  wom-
en’s greater housework was declared unconstitutional. For instance, in 1979, a pro-
vision that had been designed to facilitate women’s “double shift,” granting women 
working outside the house one paid “housework” holiday a month, but denied the 
same advantage to men, was declared unconstitutional.49
For a short period of  time, it seemed that in constitutionalism, things might go the 
same way as in the US, with some anti-gender stereotyping policies already being 
adopted in the Nordic countries, and sex neutrality becoming the new paradigm.50 
But in the end, European constitutionalism, as developed mostly in countries with 
traditionalist family systems, remained largely loyal to the longstanding tradition of  
acknowledging the distinctive role and the needs of  motherhood, reflecting the imprint 
of  a protectionist welfare state expecting the state to actively intervene to assist moth-
ers, rather than take on a direct responsibility for human reproduction and care. In 
Europe then, an accommodationist and maternalist logic prevailed, which translated 
into a constitutional validation (indeed requirement) of  measures seeking to provide 
pregnant women and working mothers with the actual means to combine paid and 
unpaid labor as a way of  ensuring that they could be present in the labor market while 
also being mothers and caretakers. In reality, this model has had equally serious short-
comings, for, more often than not, it has entailed women’s distinctive and limited form 
48 Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts, June 14, 1976, BGBl. I, 1421 (Ger.).
49 bverFGe 52, 369, Nov. 13, 1979 (Ger.). Around the same time, in 1975, the Federal Constitutional Court 
denied the claim that the refusal to make the cost of  childcare a tax deduction discriminated against 
women who carried out paid work on the basis that, if  both spouses shared the role of  the breadwinner, 
they presumably also shared children and housework. See bverFGe 39, 169, Mar. 12, 1975).
50 Scandinavian countries’ exceptionally early departure from the accommodationist model and their adop-
tion of  an active anti-gender stereotyping agenda have been linked to the specific features of  the process of  
transformation of  the Nordic countries from agrarian to modern societies, and, in particular, to the way 
this transition skipped the bourgeois phase, avoiding the entrenchment of  the separate spheres which in 
so many other European countries accompanied modernity and industrialization. Scandinavian coun-
tries granted property rights to all women rather early on. Marriage legislation reform also took place sev-
eral decades before it did in most other European countries, providing for equal property rights, divorce 
liberalization, and complete abolition of  male authority, as well as equal custody of  the children. This 
explains why Scandinavian women were among the first to get the right to vote, but also why the welfare 
state developed hand in hand with (instead of  prior to) family reform legislation in a non-paternalistic, 
gender-egalitarian framing of  care as a collective responsibility. Against this background, it is not surpris-
ing that, starting in the 1960s, the Nordic countries in general, and Sweden in particular, have gradually 
done away with woman-protective labor legislation, mostly extending protections formerly reserved for 
women to men, while encouraging the latter to play a more active role in the home, and making sure that 
the State provides care resources. At the same time, the centrality of  the acceptance of  state responsibility 
for the provision of  needs related to care clearly distinguishes the Scandinavian gender equality concep-
tion from that dominant in the US. For a historical analysis of  the Nordic welfare state and its connection 
to the family model, see also the nordIC model oF mArrIAGe And the welFAre stAte 27 (Kary Melby et al. eds., 
2000).
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of  inhabiting the labor market. Indeed, attending to the existing gendered realities 
by facilitating women’s double shift has often translated into women being placed on 
a separate track, the so-called “mommy track,” a track with different forms of  glass 
ceilings and characterized by market segregation, with more women than men in the 
informal sector, working part time, with lower pay.
One of  the engines behind the increasing European convergence towards this 
accommodationist workerist model has been the European integration process, 
with a full-bodied anti-gender discrimination law developed since the 1970s, often 
boosted by the case law of  the European Court of  Justice (ECJ), affecting the evolu-
tion of  national antidiscrimination law. Tellingly, this law has also recognized, rather 
than denied or ignored, the centrality of  pregnancy and maternity. It has accom-
modated, but also arguably entrenched, under a doctrine of  indirect discrimination 
and a substantive equality/equality of  opportunities framing, women’s distinctive 
forms of  inhabiting the labor market, such as by performing more part time work 
than men, mostly to reconcile employment and family life.51 Normative motherhood 
(i.e., the expectation that women should be mothers and that the State should facili-
tate and accommodate women’s specific roles as mothers) has been largely prevalent 
in Europe, some of  the Nordic countries never joining the Union and others doing so 
as late as the mid 1990s.
Constitutionally speaking, several doctrinal elements, reflective of  Europe’s constitu-
tional synthesis combining elements of  the welfare and the liberal state tradition, have 
shaped Europe’s constitutional, anti-gender discrimination model, including its poten-
tial and shortcomings. We can illustrate and distill them from the German FCC’s case 
law. As early as the 1980s, following a substantive equality/anti-subordination logic, 
the court departed from the formal equality paradigm, and validated differential treat-
ment, when it saw that such different treatment was intended to ensure women’s equal 
opportunities, especially in view of  their roles as mothers, mostly by addressing the 
need to overcome undervaluation of  the part-time employment option. In other words, 
giving advantages to women that could help them overcome their disparate chances 
became more important than using equality law and gender neutrality as expressive 
51 Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 141, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C325) 33, 96 (here-
inafter EC Treaty) (ex-art. 119 EEC), in force since 1957, requires that men and women receive equal 
pay for equal work. The first Equal Treatment Directive, adopted in 1976, defines equal treatment as 
“no discrimination whatsoever on the grounds of  sex, but also provides that this is without prejudice to 
the provisions concerning the protection of  women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity”: 
see Council Directive 76/207, art. 2 1976, 1976 O.J. (L. 039) (EC). In cases litigated under art. 141 of  
the EC Treaty (ex-art. 119 EEC) since the 1970s, the ECJ has interpreted this treaty to require parity in 
compensation between part-time and full-time workers, unless there is some objective justification for the 
difference. For, under a doctrine of  indirect discrimination, the contrary would amount to sex discrimina-
tion because of  the disproportionate effect it has on women, who are the ones most commonly relying on 
this form of  employment because of  family reasons: see 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 1981, E.C.R. 911, 
925–926. Part-time workers have also been protected on similar grounds under the more recent Council 
Directive 2006/54 on Equal Pay and Equal Treatment of  Men and Women in Employment, art. 1, 2006 
O.J. (L 204), 23, 26 (EC). In addition to the lower hourly wages of  part-time workers, the equal-pay provi-
sion has been invoked to invalidate the exclusion of  part-time workers from pension schemes: see 170/84, 
Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber con Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1620, 1630.
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tools to combat sexual stereotypes.52 This commitment to substantive equality notions 
became only more obvious when, in October 1994, article 3.2 GG (declaring equal 
rights between men and women) was amended, explicitly making it the state’s duty 
to promote the effective implementation of  equality of  rights for women and men. The 
challenge remains of  course to decide, in every single instance, if  prima facie protective 
or compensatory measures may confirm, instead of  subverting, women’s subordina-
tion, either by perpetuating gender stereotypes and/or by presumably limiting women’s 
market options.53 This is a challenge that the FCC has been aware of, and which, as of  
recently, has led it to support the need, if  not to reduce, at least to distribute more evenly 
the social costs of  the protection of  motherhood in the workplace.54
However, unlike in the US and similar to Italy, in Germany, it has remained uncon-
troversial that mothers and pregnant women deserve special constitutional protection 
at work (something the German Court derives from art. 6.4 GG), a duty of  protection 
that, according to explicit constitutional mandate, does not fall to the state alone, but 
to the community as a whole.55 And although the protections for pregnant women 
and working mothers have typically come through legislation, such as legislation on 
maternity leave—seen as a key component in gender-equality policies throughout 
Europe56—the FCC, like many of  its European counterparts, has never hesitated to 
52 See Rodríguez Ruiz & Sacksofsky, supra note 20, at 154. For the Federal Constitutional Court, proper protec-
tions were, however, to be distinguished from paternalistic protections that de facto limited women’s oppor-
tunities. See bverFGe 85, 191, Jan. 28, 1992 (Ger.), striking down a law forbidding women to work at night.
53 See bverFGe 85, 191, Jan. 28, 1992 (Ger.), striking down a provision that prohibited women’s work at 
night because it perpetuated an image of  women both as mothers and as defenseless creatures, reinforcing 
women’s subordination; and bverFGe 92, 91, Jan. 24, 1995 (Ger.), striking down provisions in force in the 
states of  Baden-Wüttemberg and Bavaria, which obliged men to pay a contribution to firefighting forces in 
lieu of  physical service, because both the duty and the proxy, although seemingly favorable to women, sus-
tained the traditional sexual stereotypes, portraying men as protectors and women as in need of  protection.
54 See bverFGe 109, 64, Nov. 18, 2003, on employers’ contribution to maternity leave. This decision struck 
down § 14(1) of  the German Act on Maternity Protection (Gesetz zum sChutze der erwerbstätIGen mutter 
(Mutterschutzgesetz—MuSchG), as amended Apr. 18, 1968, BGBl. I S. 315, and subsequent amendments), 
arguing that even though the obligation of  the employer to contribute to the maternity leave allowance of  its 
female employees, and the resulting financial burden, was not in itself  a violation of  art. 12 GG, the possible 
discriminatory effects of  the legislation (resulting in employers hiring less women) should also be taken into 
account, and forcing the legislator to either extend the pay-as-you-go system that it had adopted to protect 
smaller enterprises to larger undertakings, or to resort to different means to eliminate the discriminatory 
effect on employment opportunities for women caused by MuSchuG, § 14(1) (Rn. 133).
55 According to art. 6.4 GG, “every mother is entitled to protection by and care of  the community.”
56 Legislated and often mandatory maternity leaves, which are only one of  the forms of  support for working 
parents common in European countries, have a long history in Europe, dating back, in some cases, to the 
nineteenth century and the formation of  the welfare state. The early legislation was typically paternal-
istic in its concern for the health of  the child and mother (prenatal and postnatal leave being compulsory 
and supplementary income support or job-protection seldom provided). After World War II, the pronatal-
ist rationale became very explicit in social policies across Europe, many wishing women to return to the 
home in the heyday of  the breadwinner model. Yet, the late 1960s had launched two decades of  change 
during which the concept of  maternity leave evolved from a prohibition on employing women during 
the period surrounding pregnancy to one of  time off  work to care for newborns and young children, 
combined with job security for the parents. Countries with compulsory leave added prohibitions against 
dismissal from employment of  both pregnant workers and workers on maternity or paternity leave, the 
logic becoming one of  allowing mothers to work rather than keeping them in the home.
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intervene when legislative protection was inadequate. This was the case, for instance, 
in 1991, after the reunification of  the country, when a civil service reorganization 
scheme had been adopted which the court deemed insufficiently protective of  preg-
nant women.57 In Europe, then, special protections for maternity and pregnancy have 
hardly ever been challenged or seen as in conflict with notions of  gender equality. In 
fact, they have been seen as required by a substantive interpretation of  gender equal-
ity. Similarly, pregnancy-related discrimination, very broadly understood, has been 
considered to qualify as constitutionally forbidden gender discrimination.
Additionally, the acceptance of  disparate impact discrimination under the clear 
influence of  EU law has allowed the FCC to check whether formally neutral norms 
or acts could have a disparate, negative impact on women in their legal and social 
(and not just biological) realities, i.e., because of  their de facto greater contribution 
to care labor in the household;58 because of  women’s specific position within a sex-
segregated employment market;59 or even because of  women’s enjoyment of  legal 
protections linked to motherhood, including, most recently, in the highly politi-
cized context of  immigration.60 Yet, the FCC has not, for the most part, until most 
recently, remarked that accepting, accommodating, and compensating women as 
mothers, could be a discriminatory way of  entrenching existing gender roles and 
stereotypes.
It is significant that, in both the US and European constitutional traditions, the divi-
sion of  tasks within the family, and by extension the perpetuation of  social and cul-
tural gender norms and expectations, at least until very recently, has been relegated 
to the so-called domain of  constitutional family privacy, free of  state interference, 
thereby limiting the scope of  application of  constitutional substantive equality even 
57 See bverFGe 84, 133, 155 et seq., Apr. 24,1991 (Ger.).
58 See bverFGe 113, 1, Apr. 5, 2005, declaring professional pension fund rules for members of  the Baden-
Württemberg bar contrary to art. 3(2) GG, in as far as they do not exempt members from paying the con-
tribution during the time they stay at home, and are without income to take care of  their children, arguing 
that such a provision will usually place female members at a disadvantage in contrast to male members.
59 See bverFGe 126, 29, Apr. 14, 2010, finding, in the context of  the privatization of  hospitals in Hamburg, 
the state’s decision to provide employment to all employees previously employed when the hospitals were 
held by the Land with the exception of  the persons employed in the cleaning services, to be in violation 
of  art. 3(1), and also in violation of  art. 3(2), because this measure predominantly affected women, who 
usually formed the majority in the sector for cleaning services.
60 See bverFGe 132, 72, July 10, 2012, striking down a legislative provision making it conditional for 
third-country nationals possessing a residence permit for humanitarian or political reasons, or on other 
grounds of  public international law, to receive education and parental allowances by the German state 
only in case they were integrated into the labor market. The court held that the provision was discrimi-
natory and, more specifically, infringed the prohibition of  non-discrimination on the basis of  gender in 
art. 3(3) GG, in view of  the fact that the eligibility criteria to receive educational and parental allow-
ance are more difficult to fulfill for women than for men (Rn. 70). According to the court, women are 
discriminated against because after they have given birth, the law prohibits them from working; as a 
result, unlike men, women are unable to fulfill the requirement of  being integrated in the labor market. 
Furthermore, even after the minimum period of  obligatory maternity leave, mothers often still need to 
breastfeed their children, which makes it more difficult for them to find adequate employment (Rn. 71). 
In the court’s view, legislative acts that are not directly linked to unique traits of  women or men, but 
which place women at a disadvantage due to legal or biological differences, are subject to very strict justi-
fication standards under art. 3(3) GG—standards which were not met this case (Rn. 73).
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in Europe.61 Indeed, as we shall see, the FCC has systematically and explicitly affirmed 
the State’s duty to remain neutral with respect to the internal organization of  the fam-
ily. Yet, this neutrality has been easier said than done. For years, calling on it served 
to sanction the continuation of  the breadwinner family model, and still today true 
neutrality proves to be an elusive goal.
3.3. So far …
To summarize, post-World War II constitutionalism, especially as it developed since 
the 1970s, has allowed sex equality, understood as formal equality, to challenge the 
most blatant expressions of  the separate-spheres ideology and denied the possibility 
of  according men and women a different legal status of  rights and duties. The most 
significant exception to this rule has been the articulation of  pregnancy/motherhood 
employment accommodation measures targeting women, especially in Europe, where 
they have been said to be justified by a commitment to substantive equality notions. 
However, the constitutional gender equality doctrine has been an inadequate tool for 
undermining the separate-spheres ideology and the implicit sexual contract. This is 
true of  the US, where the prevailing understanding of  the state’s limited role in shap-
ing market forces together with an anti-stereotyping conception of  gender equality, 
has restricted the possibilities of  catering to the gender-specific needs of  working 
women, and ended up relegating not only motherhood, but parenting and care mostly 
to the private domain. European constitutionalism has allowed, and even fostered, spe-
cific measures enabling women to combine work inside and outside the home. Yet, the 
European constitutional model risks entrenching, rather than subverting, gendered 
roles when it implicitly or explicitly underscores the “special relationship between a 
woman and her child,” providing protection measures which can backfire against 
market forces in ways that restrict women’s actual chances to be hired, retained and 
promoted, and implicitly endorsing a limited understanding of  the importance and 
nature of  fatherhood. Moreover, both constitutional traditions have failed to do one 
thing, which is moving past formal equality and gender neutrality beyond the mar-
ket domain. Constitutionally entrenched notions of  family privacy have justified 
the courts’ resistance to interference with presumably freely chosen internal family 
arrangements, and gender-neutral norms have not been systematically assessed as 
to their effects concerning the possible perpetuation of  gender-differentiated roles. 
61 In Europe, where the institutional approach to family and marriage has prevailed at the constitutional 
level, the first post-World War II constitutional texts did not contain the notion of  a right to family pri-
vacy, and made only reference to the inviolability of  the home, intended to protect against undue searches 
and seizures (see, for instance art. 13 GG and art. 14 of  the Italian Constitution). This changed in the 
1950s when the European Convention on Human Rights recognized the right to private and family life 
under art. 8, as well as the right to marriage under art. 12. Other European constitutions would conse-
quently follow suit, and recognize marriage (often coined as a fundamental right and/or institution) and 
family (often expressed as an institution) separately. The Spanish Constitution constitutes an example of  
this (art. 39 refers to the family as an institution that deserves state protection, and art. 32 refers to the 
fundamental right that a man and a woman have to marry). But even where it was not explicitly spelled 
out, the right to family privacy has often been doctrinally derived, as did the FCC in Germany, grounding 
it on art. 6.1 GG, which simply states that marriage and family enjoy the protection of  the State.
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This has allowed de facto gender inequalities to continue unchecked in some of  the 
domains which, since modernity, have shaped women’s distinctive citizenship, such 
as the family.
4. Gender constitutionalism in the new millennium: care 
and gender roles in the family as a constitutional matter
In the new millennium, the unequal distribution of  roles, tasks, and power between 
women and men has become an increasingly contested subject. Several new 
approaches are being proposed that not only go beyond gender neutrality and for-
mal equality, but also beyond rights, crucially targeting institutions. Several legislative 
and policy agendas seeking the active disestablishment of  gender roles in both the 
public and private spheres of  participation are proliferating at the same time, and a 
new overall constitutional gender equality conception seems to be emerging, showing 
increasing convergence in departing from traditionalist and embracing sex egalitarian 
understandings of  the family instead.
To some extent, constitutionalism is facilitating, or at least not getting in the way 
of  this transformative agenda. Yet, in many contexts, constitutionalism is also act-
ing as a reactionary force, especially in older constitutional democracies where, as 
we have seen, constitutional law and doctrine had been created to emulate, rather 
than subvert, the separation between the public and the private and the breadwinner-
family model. Among the many hot points in contemporary constitutional gender 
struggles (including same-sex marriage or unions, gender quotas, sex change, and 
abortion rights), one of  the most interesting and underexplored issues shows how, in 
recent years, the division of  gender and care roles within the family is gaining in con-
stitutional significance, and is increasingly seen as being connected to constitutional 
gender-equality provisions. This section provides examples of  these evolutions, draw-
ing inspiration mostly from Europe, and signals the constitutional shifts required for 
the successful challenge of  the breadwinner family model, as the cornerstone of  the 
original gender order.
4.1. The de-gendering of  care: towards a new constitutional father?
Parallel to, and concurrently with, the movement for the empowerment of  women in 
decision-making positions (often articulated through the adoption of  gender quotas), 
we can observe an expansion of  the agenda to change how human reproduction and 
care are conceptualized and accommodated within the workplace as well as within 
the household. We find that European countries, with the Nordic ones in the lead since 
the accession of  Sweden and Finland to the EU in 1995, and European institutions 
are actively involved. This move represents an attempt to go beyond the widespread, 
traditional accommodationist European model (seeking to protect pregnant women 
and working mothers), and aims at ensuring work/family balance for all, as well as the 
sharing of  care responsibilities between men and women as a further step to disestab-
lishing gender roles and guaranteeing equality for women. Constitutionally speaking, 
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this development therefore represents a synthetic third way which promises to retain 
the best of  the traditional US and European constitutional models, overcoming both 
the shared and separate limitations of  each. In essence, the third way consists in con-
stitutionally retaining the social and political centrality attached to reproduction and 
care, while at the same time remaining focused on actively challenging traditional 
gender roles.
In Europe, the mid-1990s marked a turning point in the understanding of  care/
family and work/life balance, and its relation to the genders. If, in its original 1961 
version, the European Social Charter had envisaged a right to maternity or paren-
tal leave exclusively for employed women; the 1996 Revised European Social Charter 
required member state parties “to provide a possibility for either parent to obtain, 
during a period after maternity leave, parental leave to take care of  a child [with a 
view to ensure the exercise of  the right to equality of  opportunity and treatment for 
men and women workers with family responsibilities and between such workers and 
other workers].”62 Almost at the same time, the Committee of  Ministers of  the Council 
of  Europe approved Recommendation No. R (96)5 on reconciling work and family 
life,63 urging member states to enable women and men, without discrimination, to 
better reconcile their working and family lives (I). That same year, at the EU level, a 
Parental Leave Framework Agreement was approved in the form of  a Directive provid-
ing “men and women workers an individual right to parental leave on the grounds of  
the birth or adoption of  a child to enable them to take care of  that child, for at least 
three months, until a given age up to 8 years [to be defined by Member States and/or 
management and labour” (2.1), but also providing that such leave should, in prin-
ciple, be granted on a non-transferable basis to promote equal opportunities and equal 
treatment between men and women (2.2).64
The turn of  the century saw this agenda evolve further (though mostly through 
soft-law instruments). In 2000, for the first time, the EU Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights included a provision devoted to both family and professional life (art. 33). And 
although it still refers to maternity, and not to paternity, leave (and only in terms of  the 
necessary protection from dismissal of  a worker on leave), it also includes a gender-
neutral reference to parental leave, spelling out the specific goal of  reconciling family 
and professional life. In 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of  the Council of  Europe 
adopted a Resolution on Parental Leave, explicitly alluding to the need to ensure a 
62 In particular art. 8 of  the Revised European Social Charter (May 3, 1996, entry into force July 1, 
1999) established that “with a view to ensuring the effective exercise of  the right of  employed women 
to protection, the Contracting Parties undertake (1) to provide either by paid leave, by adequate social 
security benefits or by benefits from public funds for women to take leave before and after childbirth up to 
a total of  at least 12 weeks.”
63 Committee of  Ministers of  the Council of  Europe, Recommendation No. R (96) 5 on Reconciling Work 
and Family Life, adopted June 19, 1996 at the 569th meeting of  the Ministers’ Deputies.
64 Council Directive 96/34/EC of  June 3, 1996 on the Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded 
by UNICE [Union of  Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of  Europe], CEEP [European Centre of  
Enterprises with Public Participation and of  Enterprises of  General Economic Interest], and the ETUC 
[European Trade Union Confederation] gave effect to that agreement, which had been entered into on 
those cross-industry representative organizations on Dec. 14, 1995.
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“genuine partnership in the sharing of  responsibilities between women and men in 
both the private and public sphere,”65 and in 2007, the Committee of  Ministers passed 
a Recommendation (on gender equality standards and mechanisms), endorsing mea-
sures to reconcile private/family life and professional/public life, such as the adoption 
and extension of  paid maternity leave, paid parental leave equally accessible to both 
parents, and paid non-transferable paternity leave, as well as other measures to allow 
the fulfillment of  family responsibilities, including care and assistance to the sick or 
disabled, children, or dependents.66 Recently, both the Court of  Justice of  the European 
Union (CJEU)67 and the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR)68 have also entered 
the debate, validating the agenda of  fighting gender stereotypes around care roles.
Although still implemented across Europe only to a limited extent, the recom-
mendations and policies are foregrounding a renewed understanding of  fatherhood. 
Given the privileged place of  motherhood in many constitutions, constitutional 
courts have sometimes been asked to take a position. The Italian case provides a good 
example of  the fact that a new understanding of  fatherhood is required, but also of  
the limited reach that such understanding has achieved so far both in law and in con-
stitutional doctrine. In spite of  the Constitution’s explicit sanctioning of  the impor-
tance of  motherhood duties within the family,69 what we have observed since the late 
1980s and early 1990s, up to the present, is a series of  cases agreeing on the exten-
sion of  legislative maternity leave granted to fathers (relying on a joint reading of  
art. 3’s equality principle and art. 29’s recognition of  spousal equality in marriage).70 
65 See Resolution 1274(2002) on Parental leave (§§ 1–3), urging member states, if  they have not already 
done so, to take the necessary steps to ensure that their legislation recognizes different types of  family 
structure and, accordingly, to introduce the principle of  paid parental leave including adoption leave.
66 See Committee of  Ministers of  the Council of  Europe, Recommendation Rec. (2007) 17 on gender equality 
standards and mechanisms, adopted Nov. 21, 2007 at the 1011th meeting of  the Ministers’ Deputies, § 36.
67 In 2010, the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) condemned Spain, in the case of  C-104/09, 
Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start España ETT, 2010 E.C.R. I-08661 (Sept. 30, 2010), for sex discrimination in a 
provision denying a half-hour reduction in the working day for the purpose of  feeding a baby to employed 
fathers (unless the mother was also an employed person), while employed mothers were always entitled 
to such leave (including when their husbands were self-employed).
68 In Konstantin Markin v. Russia, App. No. 30078/06, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Mar. 22, 2012, and con-
firmed by the Grand Chamber in 2012 (Konstantin Markin v. Russia, App. No. 30078/06, ECtHR, Oct. 
7, 2010), the ECtHR overturned its own precedent (from 1998), and declared the norm in the Russian 
legislation granting only military servicewomen, but not military servicemen, a three-year parental leave 
contrary to the right to family life in relation to the principle of  gender equality (art. 8 in relation to 
art. 14 of  the Constitution). An overview of  the emergence of  an anti-stereotyping strand in the gender 
equality doctrine of  the ECtHR can be found in Alexandra Timmer, Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach 
for the European Court of  Human Rights, 11(4) hum. rts l. rev. 707 (2011).
69 Notice that art. 37.2 of  the Constitution provides that working conditions must allow women to fulfill 
their essential family duties, and ensure an adequate protection of  mothers and children (italics are mine).
70 In doing so, the Constitutional Court has departed from the distinction between the general principle of  
sex equality (ex art. 3 of  the Constitution) and the principle of  spousal equality in marriage (ex art. 29 of  
the Constitution), a distinction it had previously defended, arguing that with respect to family matters, 
the article that should be taken into consideration is art. 29 and not art. 3, because the former concerned 
women’s equality within the family entity, while the latter concerned women’s equality as individuals 
in society: see Corte Cost., 16 dicembre 1968, n. 126, §§ 5–6 (It.) and Corte Cost., 27 novembre 1969, 
n. 147, § 6 (It.), both concerning adultery regulation. This public–private separation, which hides the 
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This case law has validated a more equitable distribution of  care, and it represents 
a gradual, albeit imperfect, process of  gender role disestablishment. Moving past 
an exclusive focus on maternity as a purely physical condition, and the supposedly 
unique biological feature of  the mother–child relationship, the Italian court has 
increasingly considered the parent–child relationship beyond the rigid focus on tra-
ditional gender roles.71 As a result, fathers have been increasingly granted the rights 
and obligations established by the Constitution for parents in general.72
Full disestablishment, however, has not yet been fully achieved: the legislator 
has not provided for it, and the Constitutional Court has not deemed this to be 
problematic as of  yet. Indeed, a close reading of  the court’s case law shows a 
narrative that foregrounds the principle of  the best interest of  the child (inter-
preted as justifying preferential access to the mother in the first months of  life), 
which the court has extracted from the Italian order considered as a whole, much 
more than gender equality.73 Underscoring the idea of  family privacy, the court 
has kept referring to the need to allow parents to freely manage their family 
organization, and the distribution of  productive and reproductive work among 
interrelationship between the societal and family spheres, persisted until the court started to analyze 
working parents’ care activities. It is at this point that we can see that the boundaries between public and 
private start to blur, and that the court starts resolving cases relying on arts. 3 and 29: see Corte Cost., 
15 luglio 1991, n. 341, § 3 (It.); Corte Cost., 21 aprile 1993, n. 179, § 5 (It.), and Corte Cost., 14 ottobre 
2005, n. 385, § 6 (It.).
71 See Corte Cost., 14 gennaio 1997, n. 1 (It.) (establishing a right to paid paternity leave and paid daily rest 
for biological fathers employed as dependent workers in case of  death or serious illness of  the mother 
dependent worker on the basis of  arts. 3, 29(1), 30(1), 31 and 37 of  the Italian Constitution, arguing 
that the non-extension would amount to discrimination against working fathers and minor children who 
can only rely on their fathers’ care. In support of  its decision extending the benefits to fathers, the court 
observed that, in addition to pursuing the aim of  protecting mothers’ health immediately after giving 
birth, a maternity leave “also protects the relationships that necessarily develops between mother and 
child during that time, not only in relation to strictly biological needs, but also with respect to the rela-
tional and emotional needs which are connected to the development of  the child’s personality” (Corte 
Cost., 14 gennaio 1997, n.  1, § 6  “Legal Grounds”). Similarly, the court stressed that paid daily rest 
periods were no longer related to breastfeeding, and that consequently “their aim [had] now become that 
of  allowing the mother to attend to the delicate and challenging tasks connected with the assistance to 
the child during his first year of  life” (Corte Cost., 14 gennaio 1997, n. 1, § 7 “Legal Grounds”).
72 Following the jurisprudential line of  Corte Cost., 14 gennaio 1997, n. 1, see Corte Cost., 15 luglio 1991, 
n. 341 (It.), including foster fathers among the dependent workers allowed access to paid paternity leave; 
Corte Cost., 21 aprile 1993, n. 179, Apr. 2, 1993 (It.), extending the scope of  the right to paid daily rest 
for biological fathers employed as dependent workers beyond the cases of  widowhood or serious illness 
of  the mother, as envisaged by judgment No. 1/1987, to include all situations where the mother, as 
de pendent worker, had renounced her own right to paid daily rest; and Corte Cost., 14 ottobre 2005, 
n. 385 (It.), recognizing the right to paid paternity leave of  fathers who are freelance workers as an alter-
native to freelance mothers, provided that the latter have renounced this right.
73 This is particularly visible in Corte Cost., 15 luglio 1991, n. 341, § 3 (It.); Corte Cost., 21 aprile 1993, 
n. 179, § 5 (It.); and Corte Cost., 14 ottobre 2005, n. 385, § 6 (It.). Thus, typically, the court cites a 
whole set of  constitutional principles as being involved in a similar matter, including the constitutional 
principles of  maternity protection; the autonomous interest of  the child; equal rights and obligations 
between spouses; and sex equality in the field of  employment (enshrined in arts. 3, 29, 30, 31, and 37 of  
the Italian Constitution), but in its reasoning, only foregrounds the interest of  the child.
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them.74 And although, in every instance, it has agreed to the extension of  mater-
nity leaves to plaintiff  fathers, sometimes even explicitly referring to changing 
perceptions around gender roles,75 in all the cases, fathers have been allowed 
to access work benefits related to childcare only when working mothers either 
renounced or were unable to enjoy them, a distinction which the Court was still 
willing to justify in 1994 on the basis of  “the more important character of  the 
mother’s presence during the first year of  the child (‘the call of  nature’).”76 This 
is normative motherhood at play.
In short, although we can identify a growing rhetorical consensus around the 
importance of  work/family balance for all, the diffusion of  legal instruments to ensure 
that fathers can, and do, exercise care duties, is still clearly insufficient. This shows 
that Europe’s traditional recognition of  the centrality of  reproduction and the care 
that occurs in the family has the potential of  giving care and reproduction their social 
and political centrality if  duly supplemented by an active gender disestablishment 
agenda, which is still far from being fully achieved, even in the Nordic countries where 
it was first conceived. And while the progression towards a gender-neutral/egalitar-
ian framing of  parenthood and care-enabling measures that such an agenda would 
require would make it at least constitutionally more viable in the US, as we saw in 
Hibbs, the mandatory nature of  maternity or, eventually, paternity leave (allowing 
workers not to be pressured against taking such leaves) would doom these measures 
74 See Corte Cost., 15 luglio 1991, n. 341, § 3 (It.) and Corte Cost., 21 aprile 1993, n. 179, § 5 (It.): “the 
delicate choice of  the parent who can better attend to the child’s needs by being absent from work must be 
entrusted to an agreement between spouses themselves, in a spirit of  loyal collaboration, and in the exclu-
sive interest of  their child.”
75 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 21 aprile 1993, n. 179, § 3 (It.), literally stating that “while not overlooking the 
social function of  maternity, the prevailing interest of  the child has acquired more and more import-
ance and—moving past a rigid view on the different roles of  parents and of  the absolute priority of  the 
mother—equal rights and obligations have been recognized to both spouses, together with their mutual 
integration in the care and psycho-physical upbringing of  their child.”
76 See Corte Cost., 1994, n. 150, § 5 (It.), upholding the exclusion of  working fathers married to women 
business owners from six-months maternity leave which women business owners did not enjoy either, 
even though husbands of  women who were dependent workers were assigned such leave, just like women 
who were dependent workers: “Per la madre, invero, tale diritto può in certa misura qualificarsi proprio 
o ‘primario,’ per il padre esso ha in vece carattere derivato o ‘sussidiario’. E ciò sia per la maggiore impor-
tanza della presenza della madre nel primo anno di vita del bambino (‘natura clamat’), sia per i diversi 
riconoscimenti normativi.” Currently, Italian law—and more specifically the so-called Testo Unicosulla 
Maternità e Paternità—envisages a period of  mandatory absence from work (or mandatory maternity 
leave) for dependent workers as well as business owners, among other categories, during which they 
receive 80 percent of  their salary. This period is flexible, but generally covers two months before the 
expected date of  birth and three months following the birth of  the child. Fathers may benefit from this 
leave of  absence only in a subsidiary way, i.e. in case of  death or serious illness of  the mother, aban-
donment of  the child by the mother, or exclusive custody. Women autonomous workers also receive 80 
percent of  the salary for the described period, although they are not obliged to be absent from work. In 
addition to this, working mothers and fathers are recognized the right to paid parental leave of  absence 
for the first eight months of  the child for a maximum total period of  11 months combined between the 
two parents. Recently, L. 28 giugno 2012, n. 136 has also established a mandatory absence from work 
for fathers (of  one day) and a non-compulsory paternity leave of  two days, but only as an alternative to 
that of  the mother. During this leave, fathers will receive 100 percent of  their salary.
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in the US, given that they would be seen as paternalistic interferences with constitu-
tionally sanctioned individual liberties (of  both employers and employees).77
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even in Europe, where these constitutional hurdles 
are absent, apart from programmatic language and modest legal incentives, we find 
that progress has been slow, and, under the pressure of  so-called austerity policies, 
risks to be even further slowed down. After all, in Europe, maternity leave continues 
to be mandatory in most instances, whereas paternity leave is typically optional and 
much shorter. More aggressive measures, such as requiring men to take some pater-
nity leave, giving both the new mother and the new father fully paid non-transferable 
leave (instead of  just adding a few additional nontransferable weeks or months when 
both parents take a leave), or, as some have suggested,78 providing paid pregnancy and 
childbirth leave only to mothers and longer paid caregiving leave only to fathers, have 
not been taken. Ongoing protection of  motherhood-centered care therefore threatens 
to perpetuate gender stereotypes.
4.2. Overcoming the constitutional myth of  state neutrality: beyond 
privacy and formal equality in the family domain
So far, we have seen that the full disestablishment of  the traditional gender order 
requires both the accommodation (instead of  neglect) of  reproduction, care, and 
human interdependence in the workplace, and that this accommodation be done 
through measures which are normatively detached from women and re-attached 
to personhood. Constitutionally, some progress has been made by extending formal 
equality notions to the interpersonal relationships between employers/employees and 
spouses/partners regarding the issue of  care-related employment leave. Yet, even if  
fully accomplished, this path may still be insufficient. In the end, no subversion of  
existing gender roles will be complete unless it is accompanied by the recognition that, 
even after the necessary corrections to overcome remaining formal inequalities, the 
current gender neutral legal order may still not be sufficient to overcome the many 
implicit gendered ways of  shaping interpersonal relations that are contained in the 
legal system. In other words, the goal of  gender order disestablishment requires going 
beyond formal equality in every sphere (whether traditionally coined as “private” or 
“public”). This, in turn, would demand more decisive progress towards abandoning 
the myth of  state neutrality, piercing the veil of  family privacy, and drafting sex egali-
tarian default options, free of  gender normative motherhood and care presuppositions.
In this respect, the evolution of  the case law of  the Federal Constitutional Court 
in Germany reveals the changes required, and the constitutional discussions that 
such changes are likely to stir up. From the beginning, the FCC has systematically 
maintained that article 6.1 GG, according to which “marriage and the family are 
under the special protection of  the State,” guarantees state neutrality with respect to 
families’ internal organization. The problem is that state neutrality has been easier to 
promise than to deliver. And, until recently and with some exceptions, the promise of  
77 Suk, supra note 36.
78 As proposed by id.
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state neutrality has in fact been overwhelmingly interpreted as requiring respect for 
those couples wishing to stick to the traditional male breadwinner–female caregiver 
family model.
Let us draw an example from tax law. After World War II, Germany inherited a 
cumulative taxing system for married couples bringing the income of  both spouses 
together for taxation purposes. Because of  Germany’s progressive taxation system, 
the cumulative method subjected marriages with double income to a greater financial 
burden than they would bear under separate taxation. In 1957, the FCC declared the 
system discriminatory, finding that it disadvantaged married couples (as compared 
to non-married couples or single persons), and dual income families (as compared 
to families with only one breadwinner, typically the husband.)79 This led to a reform 
of  income tax, the state seeking to live up to its promise of  neutrality regarding the 
internal family structure. The new system allows married couples to choose between 
being taxed separately and, alternatively, embracing what is known as the “splitting” 
system, allowing the total earnings of  the couple to be divided in two, and calculating 
the tax by doubling the amount of  tax due on half  their joint income. Once again, 
given the progressive nature of  taxation, this system has the effect that a married 
couple pays less (or at most the same) as an unmarried couple with the same internal 
distribution of  income; and the higher the difference in income levels, the more con-
venient the splitting system—something which clearly benefits marriages with only 
one breadwinner.80 In the early 1980s, the FCC validated the splitting system, arguing 
that the advantages to marriage are justified on the basis of  article 6.1’s constitutional 
mandate sanctioning the protection of  marriage.81 Yet, given that the splitting system 
makes it unprofitable for both spouses to keep working unless they have similarly high 
incomes, its “neutrality” is illusory, for it does not encourage women’s presence in the 
labor market.82
Although the court has never rhetorically abandoned its commitment to state neu-
trality, or to the preservation of  a couple’s autonomy when it comes to internal family 
arrangements, its jurisprudence in the new millennium shows a greater awareness 
of  the impossibility of  strict neutrality, and a greater willingness to foreground the 
constitutional mandate of  gender equality when considering the range of  constitu-
tionally legitimate options. Interestingly, much of  this jurisprudence is triggered by 
legislative measures recently passed with the explicit purpose of  challenging the tradi-
tional division of  roles in the family, and (re)conceptualizing fathers as caretakers and 
not just income providers.
79 bverFGe 6, 55, Jan. 17, 1957 (Ger.).
80 Rodríguez Ruiz & Sacksofsky, supra note 20, at 164
81 bverFGe 61, 319, Nov. 3, 1982 (Ger.).
82 Rodríguez Ruiz & Sacksofsky, supra note 20, at 164–165, also explain how the goal of  state neutrality has 
shown to be equally unachievable with regard to the deduction of  childcare costs, with married parents, 
single- or dual-income families, and single parents being either advantaged or disadvantaged by the pos-
sible options. For FCC case law on this matter, which, like in the taxation domain, has ultimately benefited 
traditional family arrangements, with special disadvantages for single mothers, see bverFGe 61, 391, 
Nov. 3, 1982 (Ger.) and bverFGe 68, 143, Oct. 17, 1984 (Ger.).
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The most telling example is probably the one provided by a series of  very recent 
cases concerning parental leave allowances. These cases all dealt with the constitu-
tionality of  several provisions in the 2006 Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetzes 
(Federal Act on Parental Allowance and Parental Leave), fundamentally altering the 
method of  calculating the amount of  such allowances. Under the system prior to the 
reform, a maximum of  300 euros per month was awarded per child, depending on 
the net annual family income, reduced on a sliding scale basis, so that families with 
lower incomes received higher benefits. This policy, which was mainly concerned 
with income distribution between households with and without children, was then 
replaced by a policy aiming at facilitating work–life balance, increasing the fertility 
rate (including that of  young professionals), as well as subverting traditional gender 
roles. According to the new system, the allowance is to be calculated according to 
the salary earned before childbirth by the parent who stays at home to take care of  
the child with a maximum amount of  1800 euros per month for up to 12 months. If  
the spouse staying in the house had never been employed, or had not been employed 
the year before the birth, only the 300 euros minimum would apply. This way, the 
act sought to increase the share of  fathers taking parental leave (on account of  there 
being an incentive for the person with higher income to be the one to take the leave), 
and reducing the long employment interruptions of  German mothers (as there would 
be a strong disincentive for one of  the income earners to stay without paid employ-
ment for more than one year, as this would entail the reduction of  the amount to the 
minimum 300 euros).
The first challenge to the new system to reach the Federal Constitutional Court 
came from a woman who had had four children in eight years, and, being the primary 
caretaker, complained that she would only receive the minimum parental pay of  300 
euros for the third child, as she had been on parental leave for the previous one prior 
to the birth of  the youngest child. Interestingly, she argued (on the basis of  the prin-
ciples of  equality (art. 3.1 GG), gender equality (art. 3.2 GG), and protection of  family 
autonomy (art. 6.1 GG)), that the parental pay ought to be calculated on the basis of  
her income before having given birth to the first child. In its decision upholding the 
new system,83 the FCC bluntly acknowledged that the challenged provision was more 
likely to affect women than men, given the traditional and widespread gender roles in 
the family. But in engaging with the gender-equality provision in the Constitution, the 
FCC replied that an interpretation as that requested by the claimant would actually 
be contrary to the spirit of  article 3 (2) GG, because it might encourage one and the 
same parent to leave the employment market in the long term. As regards article 6(1) 
GG and its protection of  the couple’s freedom to decide on the organization of  their 
marriage and family life, the court stated that it had been respected, given that the 
legislation left parents free to choose how to organize the education of  their children, 
in fact enabling a model in which the parents themselves could take care of  educating 
their children by temporarily leaving employment.84 One can easily notice that this 
83 bverFG 1 BvR 2712/09, June 6, 2011 (Ger.).
84 Id. Rn. 9
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understanding of  family autonomy, as enabling a non-gender-biased combination of  
work and family life, with parents taking care of  their children personally, instead of  
relying on external sources for such care, has nothing to do with an understanding of  
autonomy as requiring the state not to disadvantage the breadwinner-family model.85 
None of  these understandings, however, can be said to be neutral. Either the social 
responsibility and/or detachment of  gender normative assumptions from care roles is 
advanced, or it is not.
Just a few months later, a fairly similar reasoning helped the court sustain 
another provision of  the same statute according to which the parental pay 
scheme, which allows for a two-month extension of  the parental pay (commonly 
referred to Vätermonate) (from 12 to 14  months) only in case both parents take 
a leave, against the claim of  a mother challenging the non-transferability of  the 
two extra months. The plaintiff  mother wanted to enjoy the two extra months, 
alleging her pre-term born baby’s need for intensive and special care—special care 
which, according to her, only the mother could duly provide. Rejecting the con-
stitutional claim, the FCC abandoned all pretense of  state neutrality, and clearly 
referred to the constitutional duty imposed on the legislator by article 3(2) GG to 
enforce gender equality in social reality and overcome traditional gender roles in 
the future.86 The court recalled that this social reality includes many prejudices 
against fathers taking “partner months.”87 In spite of  the court’s language, no 
constitutional right has been recognized as grounding the claim to a change in 
legislation targeting the perpetuation of  gender roles in formally neutral legisla-
tion, even though the doctrine of  indirect, or impact-based, discrimination could 
arguably lend itself  to such interpretation.
Be that as it may, it is not surprising that the doctrinal advances challenging the 
predominance of  the breadwinner-family model have been accompanied by a reevalu-
ation of  the father figure, in terms of  care expectations, which is also reflected in the 
court’s case law starting in the 1990s, but especially post-2000. During the 1980s, 
in a series of  decisions concerning the rights of  fathers regarding their natural chil-
dren,88 the FCC had validated the assumptions about men playing only a secondary 
85 Confirming this jurisprudential line, see also bverFG, 1 BvR 1853/11, Nov. 9, 2011.
86 BVerFG, 1 BvL 15/11, Aug. 19, 2011, Rn. 17.
87 Id. Rn. 19. In fact, the FCC pointed to the fact that, since the adoption of  the challenged legal provision in 
2007, the number of  fathers taking paid parental leave had increased from 15.4 percent to 23.9 percent 
at the end of  2009 (id. Rn. 23).
88 See bverFGe 56, 363, Mar. 24, 1981 (Ger.). In these cases, the FCC upheld the legislation, no longer 
in force, granting mothers exclusive custody of  children, even when mother and father lived together 
and wished to share their children’s custody. In doing so, it underscored the importance of  the tie that 
is formed between mother and child from birth, and the need to avoid disharmony by granting fathers 
entitlements that they could exercise against the mothers’ wish. None of  this was seen as contrary to 
the gender-equality provision (art. 3.2 GG), even though the underlying assumption seemed to be “that 
fatherhood does not have the same impact upon men as motherhood has upon women, a father’s attach-
ment to his children building only indirectly through their relationship with the children’s mother; that 
men are mostly interested in relationships while women give priority to caring for their offspring.” See 
Rodríguez Ruiz & Sacksofsky, supra note 20, at 167.
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role in childrearing. This started to change in the 1990s.89 Yet, only after the turn 
of  the century, has the equal role of  fatherhood, both with regards to the individual 
man and the welfare of  the child, been acknowledged, including, most tellingly, in the 
immigration context—a context which both in Germany and elsewhere often lends 
itself  to greater judicial deference.90
4.3. Beyond rights and privacy: care as citizenship duties and 
participation
We have seen how the shifting constitutional doctrines in established democracies are 
gradually validating the expansion of  the sphere of  application of  the gender-equality 
principle from the “public” to the “private” domain, daring to go beyond formal equal-
ity and gender neutrality, if  not to fully replace individual and collective autonomy, at 
least to set up egalitarian default options. It seems that Europe’s constitutional gen-
der-equality tradition, which accepts the need to minimally accommodate parenting, 
care, and interdependence, as well as substantive equality notions, allowing the state 
to intervene to correct preexisting imbalances and to challenge indirect discrimina-
tion embedded in formally neutral legislation, has the greatest transformative poten-
tial, as long as it is accompanied by an active gender-roles disestablishment agenda. So 
far, progress has been limited, because normative motherhood is still deeply rooted in 
much of  Europe’s constitutional culture. Moreover, progress in this direction requires 
not only the contestation of  gender roles within households, but also a greater accep-
tance of  the social contribution, and hence responsibility for reproduction and child-
care. Because of  this, the current economic crisis and the demise of  the welfare state 
ideology provide a serious challenge to this agenda.
Indeed, at the European level, with the effects of  the financial crisis and wide-
spread austerity policies looming large in many member states, the late 2010s showed 
the first signs of  stagnation. Thus, 2010 saw the revision of  the Parental Leave 
Framework Agreement, modestly extending the duration of  parental leave from three 
to four months, and quantifying its minimum length (one month), which should 
be non-transferable to encourage a more equal taking of  leave by both parents.91 
However, more aggressive proposals have failed. For instance, the Work–Life Balance 
Package92 that was presented by the European Commission in 2008, which encour-
aged member states, among other things, to extend the duration of  maternity leave 
from 14 to 18 weeks, and to introduce paternity leave, did not meet member states’ 
89 For example in bverFGe 84, 168, May 7, 1991 (Ger.), the FCC confirmed that, as a general rule, single 
mothers must be granted the exclusive custody of  their children, but that joint custody should be allowed 
where both mother and father wished to embrace this solution, as one can see in some of  the case law of  
the time.
90 See bverFGe 114, 357, Oct. 25, 2005.
91 See Council Directive 2010/18/EU of  March 8, 2010 on the application of  the revised Framework 
Agreement on parental leave between BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP, and the ETUC, replacing 
Directive 96/34/EC.
92 See European Commission, ‘Work-life balance package’, Press Release, MEMO/08/603 (Oct. 3, 2008), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-603_en.htm?locale=en.
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approval; and so the proposed amendments to the Pregnant Workers Directive have 
not been adopted.93 More recently, in 2010, a new proposal for a Directive amending 
the Pregnant Workers Directive was presented by the European Parliament, but has 
not been adopted, either.94 It envisaged the extension of  maternity leave to at least 20 
weeks, as well as the introduction of  a provision specifically devoted to paternity leave.
In short, what we find is that (still modest) signs of  progress, in terms of  policies 
seeking the “gender disestablishment” of  care roles, are coinciding with signs of  stag-
nation or even regression in terms of  the social and political acceptance of  the cen-
trality of  care. In other words, men and women are increasingly (though still far from 
fully) expected to renegotiate their roles, and encouraged to strive for a more fulfill-
ing and balanced life as well as an egalitarian marriage, but care, human interdepen-
dence, and reproduction are only slowly and hesitantly coming out of  the shadows of  
private life and the family repository to gain the recognition they deserve as dimen-
sions of  citizenship.
In the end, in terms of  constitutional framing, we need to go beyond both the US 
and Europe, for it is some of  the recently adopted constitutions that can be a source of  
inspiration. Such new constitutions embody the most explicit articulation of  the social 
relevance of  care as well as of  the constitutional obligation to disestablish gender roles 
and inequalities within the family, in general, and as relates to care, in particular. This 
shift is expressed in multiple ways. One of  the most recurring provisions is the explicit 
ban of  violence against women within the family.95 Similarly telling is the language 
referring not only to rights, but also to opportunities, endorsing substantive equal-
ity rhetoric, specifically in the family domain.96 Increasingly, we find that references 
to motherhood, as a constitutionally protected status, are being replaced by a refer-
ence to parenting and to fatherhood, sometimes with an explicit mention of  the need 
to disestablish traditional gender-specific parenting roles.97 Yet, most revolutionary, 
93 See Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella, Brave New Fathers for a Brave New World? Fathers as Caregivers in an 
Evolving European Union, 20 eur. l. J. 88, 101–102 (2014).
94 European Parliament legislative resolution of  20 Oct. 20, 2010 on the proposal for a directive of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction 
of  measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of  pregnant workers and 
workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (COM(2008)0637—C6-0340/2008—
2008/0193(COD)). See Michelle Weldon-Johns, EU Work-Family Policies: Challenging Parental Roles or 
Reinforcing Gendered Stereotypes?, 19(5) eur. l.J. 662 (2013).
95 See ConstItuCIon polItICA del estAdo plurInACIonAl de bolIvIA [polItICAl ConstItutIon oF the multI-nAtIonAl 
stAte oF bolIvIA], Feb. 7, 2009, art. 15.II: all people, especially women, are entitled to freedom from physical, 
sexual or psychological violence, both within the family and in society.
96 See id., art. 62. The state recognizes and protects the family as the fundamental unit of  society, and 
ensures social and economic conditions necessary for their development. All members have equal rights, 
obligations, and opportunities.
97 ConstItuCIon polItICA de ColombIA [polItICAl ConstItutIon oF ColombIA], 1991, art. 69: (1) Responsible mother-
hood and fatherhood shall be encouraged; and the mother and father shall be obliged to take care, raise, 
educate, feed, and provide for the integral development and protection of  the rights of  their children, 
especially when they are separated from them for any reason . . . (5) The state shall promote the joint 
responsibility of  both mother and father, and shall monitor fulfillment of  the mutual duties and rights between 
mothers, fathers, and children.
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although still comparatively rare, are clauses referring to the need to re-conceptualize 
care both as productive work (thus overcoming the dichotomy between productive 
and reproductive work on which liberal capitalist societies are based), and care as citi-
zenship duties.
In this regard, let me conclude with an example of  what, at the dawn of  constitu-
tionalism, would have been considered nothing less than science fiction.
 Under Chapter Nine, devoted to Responsibilities, the new Ecuadorian Constitution 
of  2008 contains a provision (art. 83)  that lists the duties and obligations of  
Ecuadorians. Together with such duties as to abide by, and enforce, the Constitution 
and the law (art. 83.1), or to defend the territorial integrity of  Ecuador and its natural 
resources (art. 83.3), the Constitution recognizes, in article 83.16, the duty to “help, 
feed, educate and raise one’s children,” acknowledging this duty to be “a joint respon-
sibility of  mothers and fathers, in equal proportion.” In article 333, the Constitution then 
considers “unpaid work of  self-sustenance and care-giving, carried out in the home” to 
be “recognized as productive work”. Consistently, it acknowledges:
the need for the State to strive towards a labor system that works in harmony with the needs for 
human care-giving, and that facilitates suitable services, infrastructure and work schedules; it 
shall, in particular, provide services for child care, care for persons with disabilities, and other ser-
vices as needed for workers to be able to perform their labor activities; it shall furthermore foster 
the joint responsibility and reciprocity of  men and women in domestic work and family obligations.
It is furthermore recognized that, in this system, “social service protection shall be pro-
gressively extended to persons who are responsible for unpaid family work at home.” 
Clearly, many of  these provisions are merely framed in programmatic terms, but they 
are certainly reflective of  a cultural shift. In doing so, they question the contours of  
spheres thus far defined as public and private, and of  the corresponding genders asso-
ciated with them. They disestablish gender, and do so as a constitutional enterprise.
5. Concluding reflections
To conclude, the new millennium is witnessing progress in the disestablishment of  
gender roles. Measures are proactively being taken to ensure that women, and not 
only men, inhabit the world of  public and private governance; to ensure that forms 
of  interpersonal support, solidarity, and commitment, grounded in love and affec-
tion, can compete with heterosexual marriage in ways that are more inclusive for all 
women and for gay men; and to ensure that fathers, and not only mothers, share in 
the joys and responsibilities of  the care that the perpetuation of  the human species 
requires, as the community increasingly recognizes human interdependence as the 
norm, acknowledging the central value of  care for all.
Progress so far has been limited. Resistance and counter-mobilization agendas 
have developed to contain the dissolution of  the hegemony of  the heterosexual mar-
riage. Corporate boards, parliaments, and—more generally—public authorities 
are still predominantly male, and predominant is also the expectation and reality 
of  women’s greater involvement in care and parenting. Moreover, in the midst of  a 
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globalized economy, with increasing global inequality and endangered welfare states 
cutting down on social expenditure, it is unlikely that we will see families, parents, and 
women significantly relieved from their overwhelming care work by the state and the 
community taking on a greater share of  the burden of  social reproduction. Nor are 
we likely to see men and women encouraged to lead balanced lives, which combine 
paid employment, the joys of  parenting, and, more broadly speaking, shared child-
care responsibilities. The homo economicus, now also the mulier economica, remains the 
central figure in the public culture, reproduction and care still mostly being either 
silenced as personal, optional, or residual, or quietly relegated to the “invisible hand,” 
operating this time not only in the marketplace, but also in the family. A culture of  
life, unapologetic and non-gender normative, is missing, including one that would 
encourage, or at least make it possible, by creating the adequate default options, that 
all people, men and women, can live out each and every one of  his or her capabilities 
to their fullest potential as a possible form of  good life.
Constitutional traditions that have simultaneously recognized substantive gender 
equality notions and the centrality of  the family, as a scene of  care, and the specific 
role of  motherhood, have the potential to allow for that centrality to be retained, 
resisting commodification and privatization, while at the same time expanding it so 
as to give due visibility to the equal centrality of  fatherhood, as well as of  parenting 
as a shared responsibility. The task is not easy, and in many instances may require 
overcoming rather explicit constitutional and legal privileging of  motherhood as the 
single care/reproduction figure deserving state and communal protection. Moreover, 
constitutionally speaking, traditional doctrines of  family privacy must be adapted, 
and contemporary gender-neutral legal systems acknowledged to be insufficient to 
overcome long-lasting and tacitly embedded gender roles. It is time to recognize that 
the notion of  state neutrality and the protection of  collective forms of  autonomy and 
self-organization (of  political parties, of  corporations, but also of  families) has, at least 
to some extent, served as a fiction providing an alibi for such gender roles, perpetuat-
ing the status quo. If  the gender order is to be fully disestablished, constitutional sex 
equality cannot be contained, in terms of  domains, and should instead inspire a trans-
formative agenda addressed at all those structures and institutions around which the 
separate spheres ideology, and the very definition of  gender, has been established.
Once the illusion of  neutrality is overcome, the greatest challenge will be to pro-
tect us all from the economic logic of  profit-oriented markets, which see persons pri-
marily as producers and consumers, relegating human reproduction and care—and 
thus nothing less than human life—to the category of  private interests. In this regard, 
new constitutions, which refer to care as a part of  citizenship and challenge the old 
distinction between productive and reproductive work, indicate a promising cultural 
paradigm shift. Without adequate public policies, though, the actual shift will not take 
place, and the constitutions will remain, like so many times in constitutional history, 
dead letter.
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